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Most scholarly attention on constitutional interpretation is focused on
the judicial branch and its role in our system of separation of powers.
Nonetheless, constitutional interpretation should not take place solely in the
courts. Rather, history suggests our Framers envisioned that members of
Congress, as well as the President and the courts, would have an independent
and important role to play in interpreting our Constitution. Yet this obligation
has eroded such that House Speaker John Boehner, with the support of the Tea
Party and his Republican colleagues, called for a "sea change" in the way the
House of Representatives operates, with "a closer adherence to the U.S.
Constitution." To that end, Speaker Boehner amended House Rule XII to require
members of Congress who introduce bills or joint resolutions to provide a
Constitutional Authority Statement ("CAS") outlining Congress's authority to
adopt the bill or joint resolution.
This Essay identifies, explains, and critically explores four key
deficiencies in the House Rule in light of the history of constitutional
interpretation in Congress, the incentives of members of Congress, and the
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realities of the legislative process. While the House Rule represents an important
step in improving the quality of constitutional deliberation in Congress, it is
unnecessarily bureaucratic, underinclusive, and fails to capture the importance
of constitutional interpretation for all members of Congress, not just the
introducers of legislation. The Rule also reflects a severely limited notion of
what constitutional issues need to be considered in voting on legislation by
completely ignoring constitutional infirmities involving individual rights, civil
liberties, and any other potential constitutional issue aside from Congress's
authority.
To address these concerns, this Essay proposes an improved rule for
adoption in the Senate. The proposed rule requires a CAS for all legislation-
not just bills or joint resolutions-but only when that legislation will actually
receive a vote. Furthermore, the proposed rule makes it clear that all members
of Congress-not just the introducer-have an individual obligation to consider
the constitutionality of legislation on which they vote. Finally, the proposed
Senate rule requires a CAS to include not just information about Congress's
Article I authority but also to address other possible countervailing
constitutional issues, like individual liberties.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................... ..... 839
II. THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF CONGRESSIONAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION ................. 846
A. Constitutional Interpretation in Early Congresses
and the Origins of a Member's Interpretive Duty.... 846
B. The Decline of Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress .................. ..... 849
III. EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN
CONGRESS: THE CHALLENGES FOR LEGISLATORS .............. 851
A. The Communications Decency Act: Voting on
Clearly Unconstitutional Legislation ...... ..... 852
B. Federal and State Hate Crimes Legislation:
Congressional Interpretation in the Face of
Contrary Judicial Authority............ ..... 855
C. The Second Amendment: Congressional
Interpretation Leading the Courts. ............. 857
IV. WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD GUIDE CONGRESS'S
CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY? .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 859
V. A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING AND INCREASING
CONGRESSIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION ........ 861
A. The Case for Adopting a Senate Rule . .......... 861
B. Improving on House Rule XII............... ....... 863
C. The Proposed Rule ..................... .... 868
838 [Vol. 67:3:837
OBLIGATION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
D. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Senate Rule ... 871
VI. CONCLUSION ................................ ...... 872
I. INTRODUCTION
There were no dissenting votes in 2006 when the U.S. Senate
last voted to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act.' Nonetheless, on June
25, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Shelby County v. Holder,2
which struck down section 4(b) of the Act3 and, by extension, the
preclearance requirement in section 5-both key provisions of the law
since its original enactment in 1965.4 Yet when several of the senators
who had voted for the law were asked before the Court decided Shelby
County whether they felt the law was constitutional, they neither
defended their votes nor expressed any second thoughts. Rather, their
consistent reaction to this question can be summarized as "that's not
my job."
Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina was reported to have
replied after "a long, awkward pause" that he had not "even thought
about it."5 "I'll leave that to the courts," he said, "I'm having a hard
enough time being a senator, much less a Supreme Court justice."6
Graham, one of the most senior members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, which thoroughly vetted the Voting Rights Act
1. 152 CONG. REC. S8012 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (showing, in Rollcall Vote No. 212, ninety-
eight senators voting in the affirmative, with no senators opposed).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973C (2012). The Court struck down section 4(b) of the Act, which established
coverage formulas to determine which states were subject to Department of Justice preclearance
based on the states' histories of racial discrimination. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631 ("[We
[previously] expressed our broader concerns about the constitutionality of the Act. Congress could
have updated the coverage formula . . . . Its failure to act leaves us no choice but to declare § 4(b)
unconstitutional.").
4. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1975: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, and
S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
75 (1975) (statement of Arthur Flemming, U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights) ("Section 5 [of the Voting
Rights Act], the provision requiring preclearance of changes in electoral laws . . . has become the
centerpiece of the act."); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of
Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 21 (2004) ("Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has served
as a major legal engine for transforming American democracy over the last forty years.").
5. Sahil Kapur, Republican Senators Bob and Weave on Voting Rights Act,




reauthorization bill before sending it to the floor,7 was not alone. His
close ally John McCain, the senior senator from Arizona, said, "I
haven't-I'm worried about other things."8 And Tennessee Senator
Lamar Alexander similarly disclaimed responsibility for having an
answer to this sort of question, saying, "No, I am not going to try to be
a Supreme Court [justice] and Senator at the same time."9 And to the
follow-up question as to whether he thought the provision was
constitutional, Alexander simply reiterated, "That's the question before
the Supreme Court,"'0 almost as if it would be improper for him to
comment on this point while the Court was reviewing the law.
Now in fairness, these questions were asked of these senators on
the fly. As I well recall from eighteen years of facing similar
spontaneous inquiries, reporters asked these questions as part of "the
ambush" that always occurs when senators emerge from their Tuesday
party caucus lunches in the Capitol. Interesting, though, is that a
question that could have been easily and probably inconsequentially
met with oft-used dodges such as "no comment" or "I'll have my press
secretary get back to you," was instead handled with the firm
suggestion that the question was misdirected when posed to a member
of the legislative branch. Apparently this issue of constitutionality was
solely the province of the nine Justices whose majestic building could
be seen through the windows near the elevators into which each senator
disappeared after speaking to the reporter.
The lack of senatorial interest in the constitutionality of
measures on which they cast votes is perhaps no great surprise to
observers of modern Congresses." As of the commencement of the 112th
7. See S. REP. No. 109-295, at 2 (2006) (concluding, on behalf of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, that "the Voting Rights Act is still necessary," and considering the law's impact in-
depth).
8. Kapur, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Various scholars and commentators have noted the decline in constitutional
interpretation in Congress. See, e.g., Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend
the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 588 (1983) ("[The legislature has for the most part ... left
constitutional judgments to the judiciary. This willingness to step aside has been due in part to
institutional pressures and in part to political convenience."); Hanah Metchis Volokh,
Constitutional Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV. 173, 181 (2013) (noting that "[tihe
balance in constitutional interpretation has shifted heavily toward the courts over the past two
hundred years"). For a review of the history of early constitutional interpretation in Congress, see
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 120 n.27 (1997) (citing numerous early
congressional debates regarding the meaning of the Constitution); Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., The
Framers' Understanding of Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, 21 GA. L. REV. 217, 218, 260
(1986) (examining the constitutional deliberation and debate process from 1787 through the First
Congress).
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Congress in January 2011, however, this is somewhat ironic. While
Republican members in the House vowed to renew focus on the
constitutionality of legislation, their allies in the Senate appeared to
take a very different tack by declining to assess the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act. Even before formally taking the reins, the new
House leadership, headed by Speaker-elect John Boehner of Ohio,
announced a series of changes to the House Rules. They claimed to offer
a "sea change" in the way the House operates, leading to "greater
openness, deliberation, efficiency and a closer adherence to the U.S.
Constitution."12 This change included the adoption of a House rule
requiring all bills and joint resolutions to include, at the time of
introduction, a Constitutional Authority Statement ("CAS") outlining
the source of Congress's constitutional authority to adopt the
legislation.13
This approach was a natural outgrowth of the Republican
Party's highly effective political message from 2010, which was fueled
by the Tea Party's emergence in late 2008 and 2009.14 The proposed
changes were drawn from the Tea Party manifesto known as the Pledge
to America,15 which Boehner said represented "the promises . . . [t]o
change the way Washington works." 16 A central theme of the political
attack on the new Obama Administration was that the
Administration's push for healthcare reform, as well as other measures,
grossly exceeded the federal government's powers under the
Constitution.17 Indeed, on several occasions in 2009 at the town
meetings I held in Wisconsin, I was confronted for the first time in over
fifteen years with the question, "Have you ever read the Constitution?"
12. Chad Pergram, House GOP to Require Legislation Meet Constitutional Standard,
http://perma.cc/DN4H-DD54 (foxnews.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (emphasis added).
13. HOUSE RULE XII 7(c)(1) (112th Cong.) ("A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced
unless the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a statement citing as
specifically as practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution to enact
the bill or joint resolution.").
14. See Phillip Rucker & Krissah Thompson, Constitution Is Focus of New GOP House Rules,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 30, 2010, at A01, available at http://perma.cc/ZHJ8-R75A ("[The House] will
require that every new bill contain a statement by the lawmaker who wrote it citing the
constitutional authority to enact the proposed legislation. Call it the tea party-ization of
Congress.").
15. A Pledge to America, http://perma.cc/L68Y-5K6P (gop.gov, archived Feb. 6, 2014).
16. John Boehner, America It's Your Turn to Speak Out, http://perma.cc/5266-G2YD
(speaker.gov, archived Feb. 6, 2014).
17. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, President Obama's Top 10 Constitutional Violations,
http://perma.ccR6RA-XX2F (dailycaller.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (arguing that "[tihe Obama
administration and its allies in Congress have perpetrated more than their share of such mob-like
actions" and outlining ten alleged constitutional violations by the Obama administration).
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As chairman or ranking member of the Constitution Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee throughout the two presidential terms
of George W. Bush, I had never gotten that question. I was generally
assumed to be very focused on constitutional matters, such as the
constitutionality of the USA Patriot Act and President Bush's
warrantless wiretapping program. But these were not the types of
concerns of the Tea Party constituents who questioned me. Consistent
with these sentiments, one of the first acts of the new House majority
was to amend House Rule XII to prohibit members from introducing a
bill or a joint resolution without "a statement citing as specifically as
practicable the power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution
to enact [it]."18
In a December 2010 memorandum sent to all prospective
members of the 112th Congress, the House majority's leadership-elect
outlined the new requirements in some detail, with the goal of providing
"early guidance for complying with this rule."19 The memorandum
announced staff briefings on the proposed rule, revealed the rule's full
text, and provided a proposed CAS form to be completed and signed
whenever a member introduces a bill. 2 0 It also gave possible sources to
assist members in "determining a bill's constitutional authority," along
with answers to a series of frequently asked questions about how this
is to be achieved. 21 For example, one question was, "Isn't it the courts'
duty to determine whether a law is constitutional and thus doesn't this
rule infringe on the power of the courts?"2 2 The answer begins with a
crisp "No." It follows with the statement, "While the courts have the
power to overturn an Act of Congress on the basis that it is
unconstitutional, Members of Congress have a responsibility, as clearly
indicated by the oath of office each Member takes, to adhere to the
Constitution."23
Although some critics have suggested that this new House rule
is symbolic at best and meaningless at worst, 2 4 it has generated some
18. HOUSE RULE XII 7(c)(1) (112th Cong.).
19. Memorandum from John Boehner, Speaker-Designate, U.S. House of Representatives,
New Constitutional Authority Requirement for Introduced Legislation (Dec. 17, 2010), available at
http://perma.cc/7B65-D9UG.
20. COMM. ON RULES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TEXT AND SECTION-BY-SECTION





24. Abby Brownback & Louis Jacobson, Lawmakers Abiding by New Constitutional-
Justification Rule, http://perma.cc/K8AJ-SKUN (politifact.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) ("'Frankly,
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interesting discourse in the House on specific pieces of legislation.25
Rather than being "trivial,"26 the House Rule appears to have opened
the door for members of Congress to fulfill a role that most scholars
believe was intended to be every bit as obligatory on members of
Congress as on members of the judiciary. 27 The early scholarship on
these new CASs shows substantial compliance with the new rule, with
this is just symbolic, so I have no real feelings one way or the other,' said Norman Ornstein, a
congressional scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute.").
25. For example, Volokh, supra note 11, considers a lengthy colloquy between
Representatives Anthony Weiner, Henry Waxman, Frank Pallone, and Tom Price discussing the
sufficiency of a simple statement that, because the law repealed an unconstitutional law, it was
therefore constitutional.
26. Brownback & Jacobson, supra note 24 ("David W. Rohde, a Duke University political
scientist, added, 'If you had a category for Promise Kept But Utterly Trivial, it would fit.' ").
27. Most argue that more robust consideration of constitutional issues by members of
Congress is desirable either for our system of separation of powers or as a constitutional duty
emanating from the oath of office. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1359, 1360 (1997) (noting that
"[a]ccording to what appears to be the dominant view, nonjudicial officials, in exercising their own
constitutional responsibilities, are duty-bound to follow the Constitution as they see it-they are
not obliged to subjugate their constitutional judgments to what they believe are the mistaken
constitutional judgments of others"); Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and
Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 62-64 (1986) (offering an argument as
to why Congress has "some responsibility to interpret the Constitution" based on the structure of
separation of powers and the existence of constitutional questions outside the authority of the
judiciary); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV.
707, 718-23 (1985) (arguing, inter alia, that members of Congress have a duty to interpret the
Constitution, which emanates from their oath of office); Mark Tushnet, Some Notes on
Congressional Capacity to Interpret the Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 499-500 (2009) (arguing
that, while Congress's capacity to interpret the Constitution is larger than one might think," it is
nevertheless "not ... as large as one would like" and suggesting some structural innovations to
improve Congress's capacity). But see David P. Currie, Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial
Interpretation of the Constitution 1789-1861, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 19 (Neal
Devins & Keith Whittington eds., 2005) (noting that "[w]hen we study Marbury v. Madison, we
learn that [Chief Justice Marshall's argument that because judges swear an oath to uphold the
Constitution, they must strike down unconstitutional legislation] is hollow: that an officer swears
to do his constitutional duty does not tell us what that duty is"); Mark Tushnet, The Constitution
Outside the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1992) (noting the
existence of this oath argument and suggesting that, "[o]f course non-judicial officials must follow
the Constitution, but to say that is to say little. The interesting question is, how should non-judicial
officials go about following the Constitution?"). Nonetheless, not all believe constitutional
interpretation by nonjudicial actors is desirable, at least insofar as it conflicts with judicial
supremacy. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 27, at 1362 (offering a defense of Cooper v. Aaron
and judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation "without qualification"). Interestingly, the
original oath took a different form than the current oath, which was adopted following the Civil
War. See Vic Snyder, You've Taken an Oath to Support the Constitution, Now What? The
Constitutional Requirement for a Congressional Oath of Office, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK L. REV.
897, 897 (2001) (discussing the lineage of oaths of office throughout our nation's history).
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such statements "suddenly flowing through Congress at the rate of
several hundred per month."28
While the constitutional inquiry inspired by this rule is a
positive development, the House Rule is inadequate in at least four
respects. First, the House Rule only covers the introduction of
legislation.29 Because thousands of bills are introduced that never
advance through the legislative process, requiring a CAS at the
introduction of a bill is unnecessary and bureaucratic. Second, the
House Rule only addresses introduced legislation and ignores the
crucial role that amendments often play in the legislative process.
Amendments can (and often do) introduce entirely new and unrelated
policy changes the original bill did not include.30 Third, the House Rule
addresses the interpretive obligation of a bill's initiator but fails to
address every other member's independent obligation to consider the
constitutionality of legislation or amendments. 31 Since part of the
House Republicans' rationale for their Rule is that the oath of office is
taken by each member of Congress individually, 32 the Rule should also
apply to each individual vote by a member of Congress.
Last and perhaps most critical, the House Rule only requires
members to give a constitutional justification for proposed legislation
based on Congress's authority (usually under Article I).33 However, this
is a severely limited notion of the full obligation of members of Congress
to consider constitutionality. Each member must additionally consider
28. Volokh, supra note 11, at 174.
29. HOUSE RULE XII 7(c)(1) (112th Cong.) ("A bill or joint resolution may not be introduced
unless the sponsor submits for printing in the Congressional Record a statement. . . ." (emphasis
added)).
30. The reason for this is the absence of a germaneness requirement for amendments under
most circumstances in the Senate. As a result, amendments to most bills need not have any
relationship whatsoever to the underlying purpose of the bill as introduced. See VALERIE
HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RES. SERV., 96-548, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE SENATE 6 (2013) ("The
rules impose a germaneness requirement only on amendments to general appropriations and
budget measures and to matters being considered under cloture, and various statutes impose such
a requirement on a limited number of other bills.").
31. Id. at 7 ("The right to offer non-germane amendments is extraordinarily important
because it permits Senators to present issues to the Senate for debate and decision, without regard
to the judgments of the Senate's committees or the scheduling decisions and preferences of its
majority leader.").
32. Memorandum from John Boehner, supra note 19, at 4:
Q. Isn't it the courts' duty to determine whether a law is constitutional and thus doesn't
this rule infringe on the power of the courts?
A. No. While the courts have the power to overturn an Act of Congress on the basis that
it is unconstitutional, Members of Congress have a responsibility, as clearly indicated
by the oath of office each Members takes, to adhere to the Constitution.
(emphasis added).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I.
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other constitutional limiting principles, such as civil liberties enshrined
in the Bill of Rights, in addition to the source of congressional power. A
bill that runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment's proscription on
"unreasonable searches and seizures," the Eighth Amendment's bar on
"cruel and unusual punishment," or the Second Amendment's
protection of the "right to bear arms" would still pass constitutional
muster under the House Rule so long as that bill merely cites a source
of constitutional authority for its enactment.
This flaw in the House Rule is not only a problem of
incompleteness, but also one of imbalance. While conservatives often
criticize social legislation as unconstitutional because it is outside the
scope of Congress's specifically enumerated powers, progressives and
liberals are perhaps more prone to criticize the constitutional flaws of
legislation that restricts civil rights or civil liberties. By merely
requiring a statement describing the source of Congress's constitutional
authority but not a limit to that authority, the House Rule addresses at
best only half of the constitutional equation. Of the various infirmities
in the House Rule, this issue most threatens the rule's credibility as a
serious attempt to encourage members of Congress carefully to consider
whether their actions as elected representatives of the people are fully
constitutional.
The purpose of this Essay is to reevaluate the House Rule in
light of these objections and to make the case for adopting an analogous
rule on CASs in the Senate. In so doing, however, I point out that, while
the House Rule opens the door to this kind of inquiry, its shortcomings
should be remedied in any Senate rule. A new rule should oblige
senators to consider the constitutionality of legislation throughout the
entire legislative process. To that end, this Essay concludes with a draft
rule that both addresses the House Rule's inadequacies and makes
senators' constitutional obligations unambiguous from the outset of
their senatorial careers.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses both the
history and decline of constitutional interpretation in Congress. Part III
illustrates both commonly noted and previously unnoticed aspects of
the legislative branch's constitutional interpretation by relying on three
examples from my personal experience as a federal and state legislator:
the debates over the Communications Decency Act of 1995,34 federal
34. The Communications Decency Act is also sometimes known as the "Exon Amendment,"
or "Exon-Coats," as the law began as an amendment introduced by Sen. James Exon (D-Neb.),
and was later reconciled into a joint amendment with language proposed by Sen. Dan Coats (R-
Ind.), to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified
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and state hate crimes legislation, and the meaning of the Second
Amendment prior to District of Columbia v. Heller.35 Part IV attempts
to generalize and offer some guidelines for how members of Congress
should consider constitutional questions. Lastly, Part V proposes a new
Senate rule with two main purposes: (1) to make a limited level of
constitutional consideration mandatory prior to voting on legislation
and (2) to guide members of Congress in analyzing constitutional
questions.
II. THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION
A. Constitutional Interpretation in Early Congresses and the Origins of
a Member's Interpretive Duty
The House Rule instituted in January 2011 by the newly elected
Tea Party faction appears to be the first explicit requirement in
congressional history for members to justify the constitutionality of the
actions they take. 36 From the first Congress, however, such a
requirement was understood to be part and parcel of a representative's
or senator's duties.37 In fact, in the Framers' eyes, each of the three
branches (not just the judiciary) was obligated to uphold, interpret, and
explicate the Constitution. For instance, James Madison, in an early
debate when he was a member of the House, famously declared:
The Constitution is the charter of the people to the Government; it specifies certain great
Powers as absolutely granted, and marks out departments to exercise them. If the
constitutional boundary of either be brought into question, I do not see that any one of
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(e) (2012)). See Exon Amendment No. 1268, 141 CONG. REC.
S8120 (daily ed. June 9, 1995).
35. 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment guaranteed an individual
the right to possess a firearm for traditionally lawful purposes like self-defense).
36. At least this is the first example of a universal rule applying to all members of Congress.
Nonetheless, as Volokh, supra note 11, at n.7, notes, "During the 105th through 111th Congresses
(1997-2010), the House of Representatives required that most committee reports must 'include a
statement citing the specific powers granted to the Congress in the Constitution to enact the law
proposed by the bill or joint resolution.'" See H.R. Res. 5, § 13, 105th Cong. (1997) (adopting rules
for the 105th Congress).
37. See Hickok, supra note 11, at 217-18 (arguing that, "in the discussions at the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, in the essays in The Federalist, and during early sessions of
Congress, those who helped to craft the Constitution described a Congress that would actively
participate in constitutional debate as it deliberated on national issues" without noting an explicit
statement that Congress should or must participate in these debates). See also, DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 120 nn.25-27 (1997) (citing examples of active Congressional
debates regarding the constitutionality of exemptions for conscientious objectors from military
service, presidential removal of executive officers, and the national bank).
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these independent Departments has more right than another to declare their sentiments
on the point. 3 8
Apparently some early attempts by members of Congress to
suggest that questions of constitutionality should be left to the courts
were "quickly shouted down."3 9
The Framers did not explicitly instruct members of Congress
that they should deliberate over constitutionality. Yet as Eugene
Hickok pointed out in his article The Framers' Understanding of
Constitutional Deliberation in Congress, discussions at the
Constitutional Convention, in the Federalist Papers, and in the earliest
Congresses all envision a legislative branch "that would actively
participate in constitutional debate as it deliberated on national
issues."40 In fact, discussions of constitutionality in the congressional
debates of that era were so frequent that one commentator said,
"Constitutional questions cropped up in the House and Senate every
time someone sneezed," and, "One has the impression [members of
Congress] must have had copies of the document at their elbows at all
times."41 While legislators did not question that the judiciary had a role
in determining the constitutionality of federal laws, 42 they saw the two
branches' responsibilities in this regard as coequal. 43 Similarly, in
determining whether a federal law was valid, the courts of this era
38. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 520 (1789) (Joseph Gales & William Winston Seaton eds., 1834)
(statement of Rep. James Madison).
39. David P. Currie, Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution 1789-1861, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 18, 19-20 (Neal Deavins & Keith
Whittington eds., 2005). Currie surveys the early Congressional debates and concluding that:
Indeed in the early Congress occasional speakers suggested that questions as to the
constitutionality of proposed legislation should be left to the courts, but they were
quickly shouted down; from the first it was understood that legislative and executive
officers had a parallel responsibility to determine in the first instance the extent of their
own powers.
Id.
40. See Hickok, supra note 11, at 217-18.
41. CURRIE, supra note 37, at 116, 118.
42. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789) (statement of Rep. James Madison)
("[Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians
of [the Bill of Rights, and] they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power
in the legislative or executive . . . ."); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1988 (1791) (statement of Rep. Smith)
("He had never been so absurd as to contend, as the gentleman had stated, that whatever the
Legislature thought was expedient, was therefore constitutional," and that "it was still within the
province of the Judiciary to annul the law, if it should be by them deemed not to result by fair
construction from the powers vested by the Constitution.").
43. See Larry Kramer, Marbury and the Retreat from Judicial Supremacy, 20 CONST.
COMMENTARY 205, 212-13 (2004) (noting that early approaches to judicial review drew on the idea
of 'departmentalism,' "which recognized that all three branches might have a say, though ... [iut
did not follow, however, that judicial decisions should . .. acquire any special stature").
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routinely deferred to legislative judgments on the law's
constitutionality.44
Discussion of Congress's proper role in interpreting the
Constitution began with the First Congress, eventually coalescing into
Jefferson's and Hamilton's competing views regarding whether
Congress or the courts bore the responsibility of limiting legislative
power through constitutional interpretation. Jefferson supported a
system of coordinate construction, in which "each of the three
departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its duty
under the Constitution, without any regard to what the others may
have decided for themselves under a similar question."45 Hamilton was
more wary of a legislator's ability to adjudge the limits of his own power
and argued that courts had to exercise a hierarchical constitutional
review to check legislative power and protect against the tyranny of the
majority.46 For the first hundred years, the Jeffersonian view prevailed,
and Congress spent a considerable amount of time debating the
constitutional limitations on its legislation. 47
44. Indeed, Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, himself the nephew of George
Washington, voiced one of the earliest examples of this deference when he stated the job of the
court in reviewing a congressional enactment was to "presume in favour of [the law's] validity,
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt." Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827). Nonetheless, the presumption of constitutionality was not
always worded so broadly as Washington's formulation. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 128 (1810) (stating that, when reviewing a statute, "[t]he opposition between the constitution
and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their
incompatibility with each other"). Regardless, both formulations read as quite deferential to
congressional prerogatives. Relatedly, some have argued that the practice of judicial deference to
Congress is "rooted, at bottom, in the [courts'] faith [in] Congress to make adequate constitutional
judgments." Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335,
1355 (2001). If Congress cannot be trusted seriously to consider the constitutionality of legislation,
then such judicial deference to Congress may be unjustified.
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane Poplar Forest (Sept. 6, 1819),
available at http://perma.ccl7CS5-PXMF.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961):
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their
own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other
departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption .... It
is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate
body between the people and the legislature.
47. Fisher, supra note 27, at 710 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 500 (1789)). The 1789 removal-
power debate and the Bank debate were some of the earliest examples of congressmen seeking to
fulfill their duties to uphold the Constitution. During the removal debate, James Madison argued:
The Constitution is the charter of the people to the Government; it specifies certain
great powers as absolutely granted, and marks out the departments to exercise them.
If the Constitutional boundary of either be brought into question, I do not see that any
one of these independent departments has more right than another to declare their
sentiments on that point.
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The extensive congressional debates on the constitutionality of
proposed legislation for the first few decades of the nation's history are
documented in David P. Currie's four-volume analysis of the
Constitution in Congress. The topics of such debates ranged from the
profound (e.g., the battle over the Bank of the United States) to the
trivial (e.g., how the Vice President, who was also the President of the
Senate, should refer to himself in documents or whether the necessary
and proper authority permitted Congress to prescribe the oath to be
taken by state officials).48 Furthermore, as Currie notes, members of
Congress took seriously their responsibility of constitutional
interpretation by incorporating originalist, purposive, textual, and
many other methods of interpretation. 4 9
B. The Decline of Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress
After the Civil War, the volume of federal regulation increased,
doctrine grew more complex, and other demands on individual
legislators' time grew.50 In practice more than by conscious choice,
Congress slowly ceded its authority to judge the constitutionality of
legislation first to the Judiciary Committee and then to the courts.
Nonetheless, the tradition of considering constitutionality remained
robust until well into the twentieth century. But, as Paul Brest noted
in Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter
Judicial Doctrine, the latter parts of the twentieth century were
markedly different:
Fewer members were expounding the Jeffersonian appeal for independent search for
principles by Congress. More and more were asserting that doubts concerning
constitutionality must be substantial to justify opposition to a measure, especially a
Speech by James Madison to the House of Representatives on the Removal Power of the President
(June 17, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 232, 238 (Robert A. Rutledge et al. eds.,
1979).
48. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 37, at 11-12 (discussing a controversy between Senator
Maclay and then-Vice President John Adams over the appropriate title the Vice President should
use in signing Senate documents. Eventually Adams acquiesced to sign the documents as "Vice
President of the United States and President of the Senate," rather than his earlier "Vice
President." Senators felt the use of the term Vice President unduly interjected the Executive into
Congressional debates); id. at 13-15 (recounting a debate regarding whether or not the necessary
and proper authority permitted Congress to prescribe the oath to be taken by state as well as
federal officials).
49. Id. at 117 ("Most of the tools of construction we recognize today were employed in [early
constitutional debates in Congress]: text, structure, history, purpose, practice, and the avoidance
of absurd consequences.").




politically attractive measure, on constitutional grounds.... By the second half of the
twentieth century, both the House and the Senate had abandoned the tradition of
deliberating over ordinary constitutional issues.51
Scholars have identified two catalysts for legislators' abdication
of their interpretive responsibility: (1) the rise of judicial supremacy
and with it a hierarchical (as opposed to coordinate) view of each
branch's interpretative powers; 52 and (2) the institutional and political
pressures that have made interpretation more complex, logistically
challenging, and politically risky.53
Chief Justice Marshall's famous statement that it is the
"province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is" 5 4
is often cited by proponents of judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation. This view, however, rests on a highly contestable
reading of Marbury,55 and judicial supremacy was not cemented until
at least Cooper v. Aaron in 1958.56 Nonetheless, this formulation of
separation of powers has proved politically expedient at times in our
nation's history when Congress wished to pass popular legislation and
deflect public anger onto unelected judges in the event the legislation
was ultimately found to be unconstitutional.5 7 In fact, this "abdication
by choice" explanation for Congress's passing the buck to the Court may
be more plausible than some notion of reasoned deference to the Court's
"appropriate" primacy in this realm.
Serious dialogue on complex constitutional issues has become
increasingly difficult over the past several decades. The sheer volume
and technical complexity of today's legislation may prevent members
51. Id.
52. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 CoLUM. L. REV. 237, 240 (2002).
53. Mikva, supra note 11, at 609.
54. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
55. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 43, at 214:
Read in context, this sentence did not say what, to modern eyes, it seems to say when
read in isolation. That is it did not say "it is the job of courts, alone, to say what the
Constitution means." . .. What it said was "courts, too, can say what the Constitution
means."
56. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensible feature of our
constitutional system.").
57. For example, during the debate surrounding a bill to stabilize the flagging coal industry
in 1935, President Roosevelt urged precisely this argument on a member of the House, stating that
"the situation is so urgent and the benefits of the legislation so evident that all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the bill, leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the ultimate question of
constitutionality." Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Representative Samuel B. Hill
(July 6, 1935), available at http://perma.cc/Q4RY-JZ7F.
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from fully understanding or reading each bill.58 Further, the pressure
to raise funds begins on day one of a legislator's term of office, thereby
reducing what little time a member actually spends in Washington
interacting with colleagues. Legislators' physical absence from the
legislative floor has reduced previously spirited debate to speeches
before empty chambers. Unfortunately, members of Congress lack not
only the time and technical sophistication to fully understand each bill
but also the political incentive to inquire into the constitutionality of
each piece of legislation.59 For example, members are likely quickly to
rubber-stamp a bill that condemns hateful speech or strengthens the
national security apparatus in a time of war, despite the serious
constitutional questions it may raise. Members are often pressured
either to vote the party line or to take the safe political route, thereby
ignoring the constitutional infirmities of otherwise popular bills.
III. EXAMPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN CONGRESS:
THE CHALLENGES FOR LEGISLATORS
There are, however, situations in which serious consideration of
constitutional matters can be dispositive to a member's vote. While the
experience of an individual member of Congress with constitutional
issues will vary depending on his interests and committee assignments,
several common situations are likely to arise. Among these are the
problems of how a member should approach voting on clearly
unconstitutional legislation, what members should do if they disagree
with the constitutional interpretation reached by the courts, and how
to deal with constitutional questions for which the courts have not
provided clear answers. In this Part, I briefly describe my own
experience in both the Wisconsin State Senate and the U.S. Senate to
illustrate the dilemmas.
58. Mikva, supra note 11, at 609.
59. Id. Mikva, a former judge and member of Congress, argues that besides the institutional
difficulty of considering the constitutionality of each piece of legislation, politics highly incentivizes
members to pass on constitutional issues to the courts:
Constitutional issues often present the most difficult value conflicts in society. The very
knowledge that the courts are there, as the ultimate nay-sayers, increases the tendency
to pass the issue on, particularly if it is politically controversial. Such behavior by
Congress is both an abdication of its role as a constitutional guardian and an abnegation
of its duty of responsible lawmaking.
Id.
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A. The Communications Decency Act: Voting on Clearly
Unconstitutional Legislation
A key test of a member of Congress's obligation to consider the
constitutionality of legislation occurs when he or she encounters a law
that is clearly unconstitutional. While doctrines like the presumption
of constitutionalityo and, to a lesser extent, the constitutional
avoidance canon6 l are premised on the notion that members of Congress
are unlikely to pursue clearly unconstitutional legislation, there are in
fact many examples to the contrary.62
For instance, in 1996, the Senate considered and ultimately
passed the Communications Decency Act ("CDA")63 by an 84-16 vote. 64
The CDA was actually an amendment to the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, introduced by Senator James Exon of Nebraska, which
attempted to regulate indecency and obscenity on the Internet.6 5 While
the CDA certainly attempted to address an issue of public concern at
the time, it nonetheless raised serious First Amendment issues.66 Chief
60. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (stating that when reviewing
a statute, "[t]he opposition between the constitution and the law should be such that the judge
feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other"); see also Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827) (stating that the job of the court in reviewing a
congressional enactment was to "presume in favour of [the law's] validity, until its violation of the
constitution be proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
61. Some have argued that the constitutional avoidance canon serves as effective shorthand
for courts attempting to discerning legislative intent. So, the argument goes, Congress would not
intend to pass a statute that is unconstitutional, therefore when meaning is unclear, we should
presume Congress intended the less constitutionally doubtful interpretation. See Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1203-04
(2006) (arguing that this follows from the "presumption that members of Congress, as part of a
coordinate branch of government, have kept their oaths to uphold the Constitution"). Nevertheless,
some have expressed skepticism at this argument. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 210
(1967) (stating that "[i]t does not seem in any way obvious ... that the legislature would prefer a
narrow construction which does not raise constitutional doubts," because "there is always the
chance, usually a good one, that the doubts will be settled favorably, and if they are not, the
conceded rule of construing to avoid unconstitutionality will come into operation and save the
day").
62. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (striking down a federal
law passed following the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1988),
which held that statutes criminalizing flag desecration violated the First Amendment).
63. The Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560-61 (2012)).
64. 141 CONG. REC. S8347 (1996) (daily ed. June 14, 1995).
65. See Exon Amendment No. 1268, 141 CONG. REC. S8120 (daily ed. June 9, 1995)
(regulating obscenity on the internet).
66. See, e.g., Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 75-
88 (1996) (reviewing some of the constitutional concerns regarding the bill).
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among them was the risk that the law was overly broad and failed to
utilize the "least restrictive means" for regulating indecent speech; as a
result, the law might infringe other categories of protected speech.67
While several of us raised these and other concerns in the floor debate
over the CDA,68 the amendment was ultimately adopted. Although our
concerns were vindicated when the Supreme Court unanimously struck
down the indecency provisions in Reno v. ACLU,69 the failure of most
senators to take the constitutional issues seriously was troubling.
Proponents' responses to the constitutional questions we raised were
perfunctory at best.70 Moreover, the bill's opponents failed to engage
with arguments concerning constitutionality.
There are several reasons why many senators were willing to
overlook the obvious constitutional problems with the CDA. First, the
bill was popular. Even if members of Congress explains their opposition
to the bill on constitutional grounds, a vote against the CDA obviously
could be (and would be, by future political opponents) easily recast as a
vote against protecting children from pornography and indecency.
These concerns are not unique to this context and undoubtedly
influence debates over other popular yet clearly unconstitutional
legislation, like the debate over a prohibition against flag burning
67. The least-restrictive-means approach to indecent communications permits the
government to "regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest."
Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 729
(1978) (holding that the FCC did have the power to "regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent
but not obscene").
68. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S8334-37 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(discussing Sable and Pacifica, and arguing that those cases foreclosed the approach taken in the
CDA); id. at S8340-44 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (outlining several legal arguments that the law
as proposed was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); see also id. at S8345-46 (statement of
Sen. Biden) (noting problems with the least-restrictive-means test for the constitutionality of
regulations of protected speech, and arguing that, "[i]f the [CDA] passes, we will have mountains
of litigation over its constitutionality, dragging on for years and years-and all the while our kids
will be doing what they do best; finding new and better ways to satisfy their curiosity."); id. at
S8346 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (again arguing that the CDA is unconstitutional).
69. 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
70. For instance, Senator Exon merely opined that "[t]he principles I have proposed in the
Communications Decency Act are simple and constitutional," and that he would have no
motivation for support the legislation if he thought that "in the very near future [it would be]
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." 141 CONG. REC. S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995);
see also id. at S8333 (statement of Sen. Coats) (arguing that the Exon-Coats Amendment "is
carefully crafted to be constitutional, to address constitutional questions"). At another point,
Senator Exon deflected our concerns by arguing that Senators Byrd and Heflin, whom he was
adding as cosponsors, are "two very distinguished lawyers, the latter, Senator Heflin being the
former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama. I think both of them would be a cosponsor
of this Exon-Coats amendment unless they felt it had adequate constitutional safeguards." 141
CONG. REC. S8337 (statement of Sen. Exon) (daily ed. June 14, 1995).
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following the Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson.7 1 Second,
and perhaps more interestingly, the CDA was brought up for a vote as
a floor amendment and therefore received no consideration in
committee. 72  Comparing contemporary consideration of
constitutionality with that done by early Congresses is problematic
because today, much of the work on legislation is done in committee.73
Nonetheless, even if the bill had been considered in committee, it still
would not absolve any individual senator from his independent
obligation to consider seriously the bill's constitutionality before
voting.74
71. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1988). The Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson touched off a national
debate that culminated in Congress considering a constitutional amendment and ultimately
adopting a federal statute barring flag burning. See generally Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning
Controversy of 1989-1990: Congress's Valid Role in Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
357, 365-68 (1992) (discussing the congressional debate leading to the adoption of the Flag
Protection Act of 1989). That statute, the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989), was
struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990).
72. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858 n.24 (1997) (stating that "[n]o hearings were held
on the provisions that became law," and that the sole committee hearing on the topic was actually
on an unrelated bill that took place after the CDA had already passed the Senate, as seen in
Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for
Congressional Action, Hearing on S. 892Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995)).
Senators may propose amendments both in committee markup or when a bill is being considered
on the floor by the full Senate. See Senate Legislative Process, http://perma.cclD6SV-PX25
(senate.gov, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (discussing the floor-amendment and committee-markup
processes). While floor amendments are an important and longstanding part of the Senate
legislative process, they lack some of the advantages of committee consideration-namely, they
are not considered in the first instance by subject-matter experts on the relevant committees with
access to committee hearings and outside expertise.
73. See, e.g., Hickok, supra note 11, at 267 (noting that constitutional deliberations in the
modern-day Congress likely happen in committee rather than on the floor as in early Congresses).
74. Others have suggested that the most likely place for robust constitutional debate in
Congress is in committee. See, e.g., Mikva, supra note 11, at 610 ("The most likely place for
constitutional dialogue is in the committees; committee size and format are more conducive to
debate."). Undoubtedly, committees can play an important role in considering the constitutionality
of proposed legislation, particularly in their areas of subject matter expertise. Nevertheless, the
review of the history of constitutional consideration in Congress reveals that, even if committees
were to undertake more substantial constitutional dialogue, that still would not satisfy the
Framers' perception that each members of Congress has an individual obligation to consider the
constitutionality of legislation. See supra Section II.A (discussing the history and origins of
Congressional interpretations of the Constitution). Furthermore, as the example of the CDA
illustrates, there are times (like in the case of floor amendments), where robust constitutional
consideration in committee would still fail to address important constitutional issues in legislation.
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B. Federal and State Hate Crimes Legislation: Congressional
Interpretation in the Face of Contrary Judicial Authority
While a legislator considering the constitutionality of a measure
before him should certainly seek guidance from relevant court
decisions, there are occasions when that legislator's own sincere
interpretation is different from that of the courts. I ran up against this
problem with regard to hate crimes legislation, both as a Wisconsin
state senator and as a U.S. senator. In the 1980s, a proposed Wisconsin
bill provided that a convicted person's sentence was to be enhanced
solely on the basis of the demonstrably hateful animus (e.g., racism or
anti-Semitism) motivating the underlying crime.75 I was one of only
three state senators to oppose the proposed law.76 To the consternation
of many of my political allies, I could not in good faith vote for the bill
because, given my understanding of the First Amendment, it struck me
as an unconstitutional punishment of thoughts or beliefs rather than
actions. While the law related solely to criminal sentencing and could
have been seen as analogous to an aggravating circumstance, I believed
that hateful motivations, as well as other reviled thoughts, were exactly
the kind of thoughts that must be protected if the First Amendment is
to have any real meaning.77
After the bill passed overwhelmingly, one of the state senators
who voted against the bill successfully challenged the law in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. In State v. Mitchell,78 the Court agreed with
our opposition and struck down the bill on First Amendment grounds,
stating, "The constitution may not embrace or encourage bigoted and
hateful thoughts, but it surely protects them."79 However, the decision
was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which unanimously reversed
the Wisconsin Supreme Court and concluded that the law was, in fact,
constitutional.8 0
75. See WIs. STAT. § 939.645 (2012) (increasing criminal penalties where an individual is
affected in whole or in part because of their race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin, or ancestry).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Pamela Moorshead, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases: Hate Crime
Laws and the Supreme Court's Opinion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1994)
(reviewing Michell's constitutional argument). For a review of a similar line of thinking, see
generally JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS 4-6 (1995) (examining historical attacks on free
speech and how attempts to censor speech may lead to intellectual authoritarianism).
78. 485 N.W.2d 807, 831 (1992), rev'd, 508. U.S. 476.
79. Id. at 817.
80. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993).
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Nonetheless, just a few years later I faced the issue again, this
time in the U.S. Senate. The Senate considered an amendment to a
major crime bill that created a federal version of the hate crimes bill
that Wisconsin had passed at the state level. Although the Supreme
Court had already spoken unanimously and I had no reason to believe
they were going to reverse course, I and a few other senators briefly
urged our colleagues to reject the amendment on the grounds that it
was both bad policy and unconstitutional (under our interpretation of
the First Amendment).8' Our policy arguments for defeating the bill
raised no constitutional difficulties: even though we knew the Supreme
Court would uphold the bill were it passed, Congress was under no
constitutional obligation to pass it. Our constitutional argument, on the
other hand, seems to raise a problem: Why is it wrong for senators to
vote for the CDA without considering its possible unconstitutionality
but acceptable to oppose the hate crimes bill on constitutional grounds82
when we were all but certain that the Court would hold otherwise?
The relevant difference, I would argue, is that in the hate crimes
context, the law passed judicial constitutional scrutiny but could still
be considered unconstitutional by individual legislators. In other words,
while the Court had already articulated its view that hate crimes
legislation is constitutional, Congress need not acquiesce by legislating
to the limits of permissibility. In contrast, it was abundantly clear that
both legislators and judges alike viewed the CDA as unconstitutional,
but it was nevertheless passed for political purposes. When legislation
is clearly unconstitutional but politically popular, there is a risk that
legislators may "pass the buck" by voting for the bill and leaving it to
the courts to strike down or sever unconstitutional portions. There is a
meaningful difference between choosing to vote for or against a piece of
legislation to express a legitimately held view of the Constitution, and
ignoring substantial constitutional defects in the name of political
expediency. While members should vote upon legislation based on their
own constitutional interpretations, which may be at odds with the
Court's, they should not vote for legislation without any thought
whatsoever regarding its constitutionality.
81. 139 CONG. REC. 14983 (1993) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
82. Several years later, with the settled law affirming the constitutionality of hate-crime
legislation, the issue turned to whether women, and gays and lesbians, should be protected from
hateful speech in this way since the original law was restricted to race, color, religion, or national
origin. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) (1968) (stating individuals who injure, interfere with, or
intimidate others due to race, color, religion, or national origin would violate the statute and could
face up to a year of imprisonment). I was able to enthusiastically support such amendments,
especially after the horrific Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. crimes. While I still believed
the underlying law infringes on the First Amendment, not to support such expansion struck me as
a violation of equal protection and an unconstitutional distinction.
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C. The Second Amendment: Congressional Interpretation
Leading the Courts
Despite the example of the CDA and hate crimes legislation,
Congress does not always shirk its obligations to consider seriously the
constitutionality of proposed legislation. One example of Congress
taking an active interpretive role and reaching a different conclusion
than the judiciary is on the meaning of the Second Amendment's
guarantee of "the right to keep and bear arms."83
Before the Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v.
Heller84 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,85 I had long believed that the
Second Amendment guaranteed an individual right to keep and bear
arms. When I argued in my undergraduate senior honors thesis at the
University of Wisconsin in 1975 that the Second Amendment entailed
an individual right, I was writing against the backdrop of more than
thirty-five years of Supreme Court silence on the issue and an absence
of scholarly voices articulating my position.86 Since that time, many
scholars have examined the issue exhaustively,87 but it nevertheless
took the Supreme Court until 2008 in Heller-almost seventy years
83. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
84. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to possess a firearm for traditionally lawful purposes like self-defense).
85. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (incorporating the individual right recognized in Heller
against the states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. Between 1939 and 2008, the Supreme Court did not hear a single case in which it
interpreted the meaning of the Second Amendment. See Anthony Gallia, Comment, 'Your
Weapons, You Will Not Need Them."A Comment on the Supreme Court's Sixty-Year Silence on the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 33 AKRON L. REV. 131, 134 (1999) ("The Supreme Court has not
entertained a case involving the Second Amendment since 1939 when the Court decided U.S. v.
Miller."). Nonetheless, there are other cases that at least discuss the Second Amendment, even if
in passing. See David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court's Thirty-Five Other Gun Cases: What the
Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LouIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 108-09
(1999) (analyzing dicta in thirty-four other Supreme Court cases that mention the Second
Amendment).
87. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN SHOULD BE ARMED 192 (1984)
(explaining the Second Amendment could be recognized as a fundamental and absolute right under
the Fourteenth Amendment protected from government infringement); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill
of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-73 (1991) (relying on an integrated overview
of the Bill of Rights to examine populist and Federalist arguments to interpret the Second
Amendment); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 62 (1995) (arguing that those espousing what he calls
a "broad individual right view" of the Second Amendment are engaged in "deception" regarding
the meaning of the Second Amendment); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643-57 (1989) (analyzing various rhetorical structures of the right
to bear arms, including textual, doctrinal, historical, and ethical arguments).
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after its last decision on the topic88-to endorse the individual-right
view of the Second Amendment.
However, over much of that period and even before, members of
Congress actively engaged in interpreting the Second Amendment and
often reached at least arguably different conclusions from the Supreme
Court. For instance, as one scholar noted, in debates running from the
Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866 to the Firearms Owners' Protection Act
of 1986,89 Congress periodically either expressly asserted in legislative
findings or implied that it considers the Second Amendment to
guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms.
This is not to suggest that Congress spoke with one voice on this
issue. On the contrary, before the Supreme Court decided Heller, there
were many examples of members of Congress arguing that, in keeping
with the Supreme Court's precedent under United States v. Miller, the
Second Amendment speaks primarily to the rights of militias. 90 No
doubt many of these arguments were convenient justifications for the
policy preferences of individual members of Congress. 91 But the very
fact that the issue was debated vigorously suggests that, at least in
88. The Court had last analyzed the meaning of the Second Amendment in United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
89. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a
Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597, 598 (1995)
(citing Freedmen's Bureau Act, 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866)) (providing, inter alia, that "the ... right to
have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty ... including
the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens . .. without
respect to race or color or previous condition of slavery"); id. (citing Firearms Owners' Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926 (2006)) (stating in the
Congressional Findings that citizens have a right to keep and bear arms under the Second
Amendment).
90. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 16500 (1999) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (offering for the record
a memorandum asserting that "under current constitutional doctrine, as propounded by the
United States Supreme Court, the Second Amendment does not establish an individual right to
bear arms"); 145 CONG. REc. S14470 (1999) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (arguing that the
Second Amendment does not support a variety of anti-gun-control positions, and that Miller
forecloses an absolutist view of the Second Amendment or an interpretation of it as assuring an
individual right). Nonetheless, this reading of Miller is contested. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning &
Glenn H. Reynolds, Telling Miller's Tale: A Reply to David Yassky, 65 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
113, 115 (2002) (disagreeing with David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and
Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 666-67 (2000), which argued that Miller precludes
arguments that the Second Amendment provides an individual right to keep and bear arms, and
instead concluding that Miller, in fact, supports the individual-right point of view). But see Brian
L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 48, 49 (2008)
(suggesting that, while most marshal Miller in favor of their particular view of the Second
Amendment, "[a]1 conclude Miller is an impenetrable mess").
91. David Currie notes that this argument was raised even in the founding era. See CURRIE,
supra note 37, at 121 (explaining that even members of the first Congress had political
philosophies and agendas and were not wholly disinterested interpreters of the Constitution).
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some circumstances, Congress is capable of engaging constitutional
questions at a high level, independent of the Court.
IV. WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD GUIDE CONGRESS'S
CONSIDERATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY?
Having given a few examples of ways in which a legislator might
confront issues of constitutionality, the question becomes, "What
standard should guide members of Congress in considering the
constitutionality of matters on which they vote?" In 1975, in the seminal
modern article on constitutional interpretation in Congress, Paul Brest
suggested guidelines that a "conscientious legislator" might use to
interpret the constitutionality of a given piece of proposed legislation.92
In 2013, the mere mention of a "conscientious legislator" is likely to
produce laughter.93 Requiring members of Congress to take seriously
their responsibility to consider the constitutionality of legislation
presumably would not register in any survey of the current problems
with Congress. Nonetheless, in an era when the institution is associated
in the public mind with gridlock, intense partisanship, a lack of
meaningful deliberation, and an obsession with fundraising and
reelection, one step in the right direction could be creating and
enforcing standards of professionalism for the constitutional analysis of
legislation. But what should be taken into account in creating such
standards for the "conscientious legislator"?
At the outset, the duty of legislators to consider constitutionality
must be explicitly acknowledged. As Brest wrote in a subsequent article
on this subject, "[B]oth the structure and text of the Constitution
require Congress to determine the constitutionality of proposed
enactments."94 Brest suggested that "the only plausible argument
challenging legislative duty to consider constitutional questions is
premised on institutional incompetence."95 This concern cannot be
dismissed out of hand. Many legislators are not lawyers, and the
92. Paul Brest, A Conscientious Legislator's Guide to the Constitution, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585,
589-94 (1975).
93. See, e.g., Frank Newport, Congress Approval Holding Steady at 15%,
http://perma.cc/ZCC5-HHB5 (gallup.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (explaining present Congressional
approval ratings are still low at fifteen percent and well below the historical average approval
rating of thirty-three percent); John Stephens, Congress Approval Rating Lower than Cockroaches,
Genghis Khan, and Nickelback, Poll Finds, http://perma.cc/KJ9A-ZSCM (hufflngtonpost.com,
archived Feb. 6, 2014) (referencing a Public Policy Polling press release wherein the public ranked
lice, brussels sprouts, and Genghis Khan more favorably than the current Congress).
94. Brest, supra note 27, at 62.
95. Brest, supra note 92, at 588.
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legislative process is not well suited for systematic and dispassionate
examination of constitutional questions. Additionally, many
constitutional issues arise only as legislation is being implemented.96
But "it would be premature to assume [Congress cannot adequately
interpret the Constitution] until legislators recognize their duty to
interpret the Constitution and learn how to do it."97
Acknowledgement of the duty raises many other questions.
Should legislators rely only on their own interpretation of the
Constitution's plain text or on their own personal understanding of the
Founders' intent? Are they entitled to make their own judgment as to
what a "living Constitution" should look like as they seek to represent
the modern constituents who elected them? What weight is a legislator
obligated to give the decisions of the federal courts, and in particular
the U.S. Supreme Court? Brest posited that, because "the judiciary" is
the Constitution's "most skilled, disinterested, and articulate
interpreter," "judge-made constitutional doctrine" should "carry a
strong presumption of correctness in legislative chambers."98 A less
deferential view is expounded in Larry Kramer's direct assault on the
primacy of judicial review in The People Themselves. He strongly
suggests that even the measured or mild deference suggested by Brest
is unnecessary and perhaps unwarranted given Congress's independent
role in interpreting the Constitution.99 Current conventional wisdom
supports a third, more Hamiltonian notion of almost complete deference
to settled Supreme Court decisions and doctrine. Regardless of which
approach is most consistent with the Founders' intentions, there can be
little justification for a legislator simply to ignore relevant case law and
fail independently to assess constitutionality. At a minimum, a
legislator-particularly a measure's proponent-presumably hopes to
prevent a bill from being subsequently struck down by the courts. 00
96. Id.
97. Id. at 601.
98. Id. at 588.
99. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 125-26, 247-48 (2004) (discussing Marbury
v. Madison and arguing that the famous line "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is," does not mean that the judiciary is the exclusive
expositor of the meaning of the Constitution, but rather "[w]hat it said was 'courts, too, can say
what the Constitution means,' " and arguing that "to control the Supreme Court, we must lay claim
to the Constitution ourselves . . . [and] publically repudiat[e] Justices who say that they, not we
possess ultimate authority to say what the Constitution really means").
100. Nonetheless, there undoubtedly are examples of legislators either wanting legislation to
be struck down or at least heavily altered by the courts.
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Thus, ignoring constitutional considerations could result in wasteful
legislative effort and expenditure of political capital.101
Questions further arise, therefore, about how a legislator should
analyze whether a court will prospectively uphold a new measure as
constitutional. Should the legislator consult his own vision of
constitutionality to determine what the proper ruling should be,
regardless of established precedent? Should our legislators attempt to
simply predict a ruling based on the current composition of the Supreme
Court? And should that judgment be based on the view that decision
would be clear, as in a nine-to-zero or seven-to-two ruling, or would a
belief that it could go either way, five to four or four to five, be sufficient
or even relevant? Or is it sufficient that the legislator simply have a
colorable, good faith argument, even if it may seem like a long shot?
May a legislator consider significant movement in the federal circuit
courts on the issue, as I did when the question of an individual right to
bear arms became relevant to my consideration of some legislation? Is
it appropriate to vote for an amendment with the purpose of "testing
the limits" of a fairly established judicial doctrine?
I would suggest that there should be significant latitude
accorded to members in making these kinds of determinations. Each
member may have or may develop over time a different approach to
constitutional issues. What matters is that the legislator has some
approach and thoughtfully employs it in evaluating legislation.
Nonetheless, legislators will not develop these individual approaches
without formal guidance. The following proposed Senate rule seeks to
provide an important first step toward such formal guidance. However,
I recognize that, as with other changes to Senate procedures, further
reforms and additional guidance may be necessary over time.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING AND INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
A. The Case for Adopting a Senate Rule
At least as far back as 1983, those who noticed the lack of serious
constitutional consideration in Congress have tried to suggest how the
101. For example, one need look no further than the extensive debates regarding the line-item
veto for an extensive and politically taxing debate that was ultimately fruitless on account of the
Supreme Court's decision. See generally Brent Powell, Line Item Veto, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253,
253-54 (2000) (reviewing the history of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 (LIVA), the Supreme Court's
decision in Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), which ultimately struck down the
LIVA, and numerous subsequent congressional proposals).
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problem could be remedied. After providing an unflattering view of the
situation, former Congressman and then-Judge Abner Mikva felt the
most likely place to enhance "constitutional dialogue" was within
committee proceedings, noting that "committee size and format are
more conducive to debate." 102 Others have suggested that pressure
might be brought to bear on Congress if the Supreme Court were to
accord "a presumption of interpretive correctness to the Senate's
interpretation only if [it] increases individual constitutional rights and
only if there was serious deliberation in the chamber about the
constitutional right at stake."103 Still others have proposed that the
Court essentially punish Congress for this "gradual abdication of
constitutional judgment by the legislative branch to the judicial branch"
by not adopting the canon of constitutional avoidance whenever
members of Congress pass legislation they believe is unconstitutional
simply for political gain.104 Yet not until the adoption of the new House
Rule in 2011 did attention turn to the possibility of establishing formal
requirements for members within the context of the power of each
House to "determine the rules of its proceedings" under Article I,
Section 5 of the Constitution.
In the new academic literature emerging in reaction to this new
requirement, praise for the House Rule has been tempered with concern
that it is being interpreted to require only "statements of constitutional
authority" as opposed to "analyses of constitutionality." 0 5 Some have
recommended various means of enhancing the rule by creating
procedures for amending a CAS to better reflect the relevant
constitutional issues raised by the legislation (in the opinion of the
member offering the amendment), requiring CASs at multiple stages of
the legislative process, or otherwise expanding the number of
representatives with input on a CAS.106
Taking a cue from the House, I propose that the Senate now try
its hand at creating a new rule pursuant to Article I, Section 5. In doing
so, however, the Senate should broaden the requirements and provide
clearer instructions to members of Congress about their responsibilities
to consider constitutionality.
102. Mikva, supra note 11, at 610.
103. Katyal, supra note 44, at 1340.
104. Anant Raut & J. Benjamin Schrader, Dereliction of Duty: When Members of Congress Vote
for Laws They Believe to be Unconstitutional, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 511, 530 (2007).
105. Marc Spindelman, House Rule XI: Congress and the Constitution, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1317,
1318-19 (2011).
106. Volokh, supra note 11, at 213-21 (discussing several potential reforms of the CAS
requirement).
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A proposal to further amend the Senate rules may meet some
resistance merely on the grounds that the Standing Rules of the Senate
have already become too extensive and now cover matters that are
pushing or exceeding the boundaries of "determining the rules of
proceedings." 07 As originally written in 1789, there were only twenty
rules, all encompassed within six hundred words.108 The number of
rules is now up to fifty-four, and their focus has shifted significantly.
The initial rules governed obvious matters, such as the content of the
"oath," the rules for a quorum, the "order of business," and mundane
matters like what a senator could eat on the Senate floor. 09 Beginning
in the 1970s, however, a series of lengthy-and I think important-
rules were added that now constitute what is in effect a code of
senatorial ethics. The rules mandate public financial disclosure,
indicate what gifts can be accepted from outside entities, and establish
restrictions on foreign travel and conflicts of interest. 110 Unlike the
original twenty rules, which all concerned internal proceedings, the new
rules concern the behavior of senators outside the body itself. A new
rule mandating consideration of the constitutionality of proposed
legislation therefore fits more naturally in the original conception of the
Senate rules. For this reason, the rule may not encounter the resistance
faced by more recent additions expanding the rules' domain. Indeed,
had this rule been proposed in 1789, no one would likely have objected,
because an obligation to consider constitutionality was simply assumed.
B. Improving on House Rule XII
The central myth and ethos of the U.S. Senate is that of the
"cooling saucer."'1 ' In a probably apocryphal anecdote, Thomas
Jefferson is said to have returned from his duties in France after the
conclusion of the Constitutional Convention and, having not been a part
of those deliberations, to have asked George Washington over tea why
107. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
10. See 1 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 45-47 (Mary Sharon Hall ed., 1988) (discussing the first Senate and the
initial adoption of rules for the body).
109. See Reid Seeks Permission for Popcorn During Senate Viewing of 'Lincoln,'
http://perma.cc/LA6F-M5A4 (washington.cbslocal.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (noting the efforts of
Majority Leader Harry Reid to secure the authority to serve popcorn at a Senate showing of
Lincoln).
110. See, e.g., SENATE RULE XLI (2008) (110th Cong.) (governing the fundraising activities that
can be conducted by employees of the Senate); SENATE RULE XXXV (2008) (110th Cong.)
(restricting gifts that Senators, officers, and employees can receive).
111. See Senate Legislative Process, supra note 72.
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the Senate was created and why it was formed in the way it was. In
response, Washington asked Jefferson why he had poured some of his
tea into his saucer. When Jefferson replied, "to cool it," Washington said
that the Senate was intended to be the "cooling saucer" to the heated
passions of the popularly elected House. 112 Given the gridlock that now
afflicts the Senate, one of my students remarked that it seemed more
like a "deep freezer" today. But this gridlock has much to do with
partisanship and essentially nothing to do with the careful deliberation
clearly implied in the notion of the "cooling saucer."113 In other words,
the Senate does not seem any more functional than the House and is
greatly in need of both a better reputation and a better reality in order
to restore its legitimacy in the eyes of the American people. A new
Senate rule requiring serious consideration of the constitutionality of
proposed measures could give the public at least one reason to believe
the Senate is performing one important aspect of the legitimate cooling-
saucer function intended by the Founders.
In order to do so, however, the new Senate rule must be both
broader and more evenhanded than House Rule XII. While its form (as
a House rule) is unprecedented, the House Rule is extremely limited in
breadth and scope vis-A-vis both the legislative process and the
Constitution itself. There are at least four areas that need expansion or
improvement. First, the House Rule requires a CAS only at the time the
bill is introduced, one reason that some have criticized the rule as mere
symbolism. 114 While members of Congress love to send out press
releases hailing their introduction of a new piece of legislation, and such
press releases are sure to elicit some press coverage, the introduction of
a bill is rarely a very significant moment in the legislative process. A
bill first must be referred to committee, where it hopefully gets a
hearing and a vote before returning to the floor. If subsequently passed
by both houses, it is sent to the President for his signature. 115 Of course,
very few bills make it even to the initial stages after introduction, let
alone ultimately get passed. In addition, in any legislative body,
legislators commonly introduce bills with the knowledge or perhaps
even preference that they go nowhere-for instance, when introduced
112. Id.
113. Jonathan Weisman, New Senate's First Task Will Likely Be Trying To Fix Itself,
http://perma.cc/FJY9-J5YX (nytimes.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) ('The Senate-the legislative
body that was designed as the saucer to cool the House's tempestuous teacup-has become a deep
freeze, where even once-routine matters have become hopelessly stuck and a supermajority is
needed to pass almost anything.").
114. See Brownback & Jacobson, supra note 24 (quoting Norm Ornstein).
115. Senate Legislative Process, supra note 72.
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simply to satisfy the wishes of a constituency or a special interest. This
is not an attractive practice, but a bureaucratic requirement to insist
on a CAS seems unnecessary far before there is any reason to believe
any member of Congress will ever have to cast a vote on the legislation.
Second, the House Rule, while requiring statements for all
introduced bills, has no rules regarding proposed amendments that may
be attached to any legislation. As discussed earlier in the example of
the Communications Decency Act,116 which was itself an amendment,
sometimes an amendment is more consequential constitutionally than
the bill itself. Just as it seems unnecessary to require a CAS for the
filing of all bills, it would also be unduly burdensome to require the
same when any amendment is filed in committee or on the floor.
Sometimes hundreds of amendments are filed, often for dilatory
purposes.'17 Applying the CAS requirement to all amendments might
deter that practice. Nonetheless, there seems to be no good reason to
require this at the outset. Instead, a CAS should be required for an
amendment prior to the time the amendment is actually voted on in
committee or on the floor, so that senators are able to consider its
constitutionality in a reasonably deliberative manner. This approach
strikes the appropriate balance between ensuring that members have
time to consider constitutional issues raised by a proposed amendment
while still ensuring that a CAS is not required for amendments that
will never receive a vote.
Third, the House Rule focuses exclusively on the bill's author to
assess its constitutionality. However, this is only a small part of a
member of Congress's obligation. After all, only rarely does a member
vote on or advance a piece of legislation, or even an amendment, that
he authored. Instead, members far more often must decide how to vote
on another member's bill or amendment. Whether the obligation to
consider constitutionality emanates from the oath of office or Congress's
role in the inherent structure of the Constitution, members should be
clearly instructed that each time they vote, they should be mindful of
any constitutional objections that can be made to an "aye" vote, or more
accurately, the passage of legislation that their "aye" vote enables. A
proposed Senate rule should explicitly acknowledge this obligation, but
with the understanding that a member is not expected to be a
constitutional law expert. Each member, however, is expected to work
with his staff and the relevant congressional agencies to make a good
116. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text (providing the Communications Decency
Act as an example of an act that raised serious First Amendment issues).
117. See, e.g., Senators File Hundreds of Amendments to Immigration Bill,
http://perma.cclVD5R-5PUW (foxnews.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (providing one example of
amendments being filed to delay the progress of proposed legislation).
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faith effort to consider the fairly evident constitutional concerns that
proposed legislation raises. In other words, a Senate rule should make
it clear that this is their job.
A Senate rule should also improve on the House Rule by
acknowledging that voting on legislation often involves a wide range of
provisions that may have begun as separate bills or amendments but
are assembled into one large up-or-down package on which a legislator
must vote simply yes or no. Obvious examples of this include the
Affordable Care Act, the frequent Omnibus Appropriations bills, and
the current immigration proposal. In such situations, some provision
will likely prompt a constitutional challenge. The reality for a
''conscientious legislator" in that situation is to consider whether any
one or combination of provisions is so constitutionally flawed and
central to the bill that the defect requires a "no" vote. Many opponents
of President Obama's healthcare law argued exactly that with regard to
the so-called individual mandate." 8 While the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected this challenge," 9 if the Court had struck down the
individual-mandate provision, it would have then needed to decide
whether the rest of the bill could be preserved without the individual
mandate.
A Senate rule should make clear to members of Congress that
the responsibility to think these implications through is initially theirs
and not one simply to be left to the Court. This may affect how Congress
decides whether or not to insert a nonseverability clause into a bill-
thereby leaving the Court with no discretion, as was unsuccessfully
attempted when Congress passed the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance bill 20 in 2001.121 This is an important determination that all
members should understand, because some relatively minor provisions
may arguably be unconstitutional but do not go to the core of the bill.
In fact, the opponents of the McCain-Feingold bill, led by Senator Mitch
McConnell, tried, in effect, to "booby trap"122 the bill. By voting for some
Democratic amendments of dubious constitutionality, such as the so-
called millionaire's amendment,123 Senator McConnell hoped to force
118. Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate, http://perma.cc/C99P-5664 (newyorker.com, archived
Feb. 6, 2014) ("In December, 2009, in a vote on the bill, every Senate Republican voted to call the
individual mandate 'unconstitutional."').
119. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2676 (2012).
120. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 100 (codified at
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (2012)).
121. See, e.g., Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 227, 229-30 (discussing the severability debate in the McCain-Feingold legislation).
122. Id.
123. 147 CONG. REC. S2550 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2001) (showing seventy senators voting in the
affirmative including Senator McConnell).
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the Court to strike down the entire law even if only one of those
provisions was held unconstitutional. Members need more guidance in
weighing the relative importance of provisions that may contain some
constitutional infirmities.
Fourth, and most importantly, the House Rule is tilted not only
constitutionally, but almost certainly politically as well. Why does the
House Rule extend only to the question of whether a proposed act is
within Congress's enumerated powers under Article I? This is
undoubtedly a legitimate consideration that should never have been
omitted from congressional discussion throughout the twentieth
century. I do not suggest that legislation during the post-New Deal era
was by and large unconstitutional, merely that there was an increasing
lack of attention paid to the boundaries of federal power. This
ultimately played into the hands of those who argued, with some
success, that the expansive role of the federal government appeared to
have no discernable limits.12 4 Nonetheless, granting such enumerated
powers to Congress was a critical and difficult part of the process of
convincing the states to give up some of their autonomy and their
individual veto power under the Articles of Confederation in favor of a
new central government.125 On the other hand, we also know that the
draft of the Constitution even with its limitations on federal power
could not muster the votes necessary for ratification. 2 6 To assure
ratification, the Constitution's proponents had to promise that the first
Congress would immediately consider amending the Constitution to
add what is now known as the Bill of Rights.127 Accordingly, why would
the House Rule only ask the bill's author to identify the provisions of
Article I that permit such legislative action without also asking him to
consider whether other constitutional provisions prohibit the action?
What of the friction between the "sneak and peek" search provisions of
124. Of course, the Supreme Court reversed this trend somewhat with their recent decisions
on the limits of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02
(2000) (holding that Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact a
statute that provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995) (holding that Congress did not have the authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990).
125. See Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 61,
68 (1996) (noting that "the Constitution's key defenders during the struggle over ratification
contended that Article I of the proposed Constitution constituted a 'bill of rights' because it granted
by enumeration only limited powers to the national government and thereby 'retained' a vast range
of rights against federal intrusion").
126. See generally RICHARD E. LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 3-256 (2006) (discussing the various challenges involved in the ratification of the
Constitution).
127. Id. at 113.
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the USA Patriot Act and the Fourth Amendment? 128 Or the conflict
between the Fifth Amendment's due process protections and the "three
strikes and you're out" criminal law proposals? 129 What of the provisions
limiting the ancient right of habeas corpus in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?130 And what of the guarantees of
the First Amendment limiting efforts to restrict objectionable material
on the Internet?
A Senate rule should place the consideration of such
constitutional objections on the same plane as the question of whether
the enumerated powers of Congress permit such actions. To do less is
to adopt one set of legitimate concerns about constitutionality (related
to limiting federal power) while relegating other concerns (relating to
protecting individual rights) to the current haphazard or minimal
consideration that characterizes most congressional deliberation on
most constitutional matters.
C. The Proposed Rule
Below is a proposed Senate rule that addresses each flaw of the
House Rule. In Section I, members are directed to consider the
constitutionality of legislation when voting on a bill or an amendment
by considering both the constitutional source of authority and the
bounds of such authority found elsewhere in the Constitution. Section II
similarly requires senators to consider sources of authority and bounds
of that authority when submitting legislation, and it additionally
requires the introducer to submit a statement summarizing this
constitutional analysis when the bill is placed on the legislative
calendar or an amendment is offered for consideration. The statement
of constitutional authority and analysis is therefore only required when
it is somewhat likely that a bill or amendment will be debated and voted
upon.
128. See Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA Patriot Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1145, 1183-90 (2004) (reviewing the history and constitutional arguments regarding the
Patriot Act including the "sneak and peek" provisions).
129. See Rose A. Coonen, Note, United States v. Gatewood: Does the Three Strikes Statute
Violate Due Process and Undermine the Presumption of Innocence?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 83, 85 (2001)
(arguing that the burden of proof placed upon defendants by the Three Strikes Law violates due
process).
130. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see also Lyle Denniston, Is AEDPA
Unconstitutional?, http://perma.cc/JZL7-4RE7 (scotusblog.com, archived Feb. 6, 2014) (discussing
the case Irons v. Carey and the constitutionality of the AEDPA).
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RULES OF THE SENATE
XLV
I.
(a) When voting on a bill, joint resolution, amendment, or
conference report, a Senator shall consider and independently
evaluate the constitutionality of all aspects of the legislation.
(b) In evaluating the constitutionality of any aspect of a bill, joint
resolution, amendment, or conference report, a Senator shall
consider:
(1) the constitutional power and textual authority of the
Congress to enact the legislation;
(2) the bounds of such authority found elsewhere in the
Constitution, including but not limited to individual
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, other
constitutional amendments, and any powers explicitly
reserved to the judicial branch, executive branch, or to
the states;
(3) Supreme Court or other judicial precedent; and
(4) whether any constitutional flaws are severable from the
legislation.
II.
When a bill is placed on the Legislative Calendar, or an amendment or
conference report is offered for consideration, the sponsor shall submit
for printing in the Congressional Record a statement providing the
following information:
(a) Constitutional Power and Textual Authority of the
Proposed Bill.
(1) As specifically as practicable, the statement must cite the
power or powers granted to Congress in the Constitution
to enact the bill, joint resolution, amendment, or
conference report, including the specific Article, Section,
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and Clause of the Constitution from which that power
derives.
(b) Relevant Precedent, Bounds, and Limitations of Authority
cited in Section II(a)(1).
(1) With some depth, the statement must discuss precedent
germane to the authority to enact the bill, joint
resolution, amendment, or conference report. Examples
of precedent include but are not limited to:
(i) the Federalist Papers, the Congressional Record,
and any other historical texts; and
(ii) decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
lower courts, or other common-law precedents.
(2) The statement may also include constitutional analyses
and argument relevant to the application and use of
Congressional power in enacting the bill, joint resolution,
amendment, or conference report. Examples of useful
constitutional arguments may be found in:
(i) Congressional Research Service reports, and
(ii) academic research or other scholarly
constitutional analyses.
(c) As specifically as practicable, the statement must cite any
other Constitutional provisions or relevant precedents that
may be in tension with, impose a bound upon, or limit the
power cited in Section II(a)(1) of this Rule.
(1) Constitutional provisions that may limit or bound
congressional power include but are not limited to:
(i) individual rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights
or other constitutional amendments;
(ii) decisions of the United States Supreme Court or
other courts; and
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(iii) powers explicitly or implicitly reserved by the
Constitution as the exclusive province of the
executive branch, the judicial branch, or the
states.
Before consideration of a House bill or joint resolution, the chair of a
committee of jurisdiction may submit the statement required under
Section II as though the chair were the sponsor of the House bill or joint
resolution. The statement shall appear in a portion of the Record
designated for that purpose and be made publicly available in electronic
form by the Clerk.
D. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Senate Rule
Despite the failings of the House Rule and the efforts of this
proposed rule to address those failings, members of the Congress may
still not take seriously their obligations to consider constitutionality.
First, any attempt to alter the behavior of individual members of
Congress must confront the ample incentives members have to abdicate
their responsibilities. 131 Furthermore, even if Congress begins to take
its consideration of constitutional issues more seriously as a result of
this rule, it will likely nevertheless choose to allocate the responsibility
for that consideration to a committee, as suggested by Mikva,132 or to
congressional staff or the Congressional Research Service, rather than
treat this rule as reflecting their individual obligations.
While these may initially seem to be significant criticisms of this
proposed approach, they are, in fact, only one of a range of possibilities
that nevertheless address this Article's core concern-that Congress is
currently failing in its obligation adequately to consider the
constitutionality of legislation. Yet the rule makes clear that the
obligation to consider constitutionality is vested in each individual
131. See generally Louis Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST.
LOUIs U. L.J. 931, 946-1005 (1999) (discussing reasons why Congress has abdicated the War and
Spending Powers to the President); Douglas R. Williams, Demonstrating and Explaining
Congressional Abdication: Why Does Congress Abdicate Power?, 43 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1013, 1013
(1999) (focusing on Congress's abdication of the War Powers). Nonetheless, it is important to note
that, while these incentives have always existed, Congress did not always act on them. Instead,
what has changed is the political culture that allows this abdication by accepting the idea that it
is the job of the courts and not Congress to interpret the Constitution. Part of the goal of this
proposal is to make it clear to members of Congress that this view is neither historically justifiable
nor desirable.
132. Mikva, supra note 11, at 610 (arguing that "[t]he most likely place for constitutional
dialogue is in the committees; committee size and format are more conducive to debate").
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member of Congress, not only in the Congress as a whole, a committee,
staff, or the Congressional Research Service. Unsurprisingly, some may
be skeptical that members of Congress will take seriously such an
important, even if precatory, obligation. Nevertheless, anecdotal
evidence suggests that, at least in the case of similar rules governing
the behavior of senators, many members take such obligations
seriously.133 Furthermore, even if this proposed rule alters only a few
members' deliberations and votes each year, that limited success would
nevertheless reflect a deeper and more serious level of consideration of
constitutional issues in Congress than currently exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an era of significant decline in the credibility and even the
perceived legitimacy of Congress, requiring its members to take
seriously the constitutionality of their actions is an opportunity to
improve its reputation. Some may view this rule as just another process
that will "slow things down" in an already log-jammed and highly
partisan institution. This sentiment fails to recognize that Congress's
reputational problems partially relate to a belief that Congress is not
really debating or deliberating in good faith but is simply retreating to
partisan battle lines. This concern has been exacerbated by Congress
abdicating and leaving to the courts its historic responsibility to
consider constitutionality on its own.
In this respect, the House Rule of January 2011 regarding
Constitutional Authority Statements at the time bills are introduced is
a foot in the door. Under the House Rule, all members of the House are
required, essentially for the first time, to take at least one aspect of their
obligation to consider constitutionality more seriously. The House Rule,
however, is woefully inadequate as a comprehensive guide and
requirement. Accordingly, this Essay recommends a new rule for the
other body, the Senate, with the thought that the House may ultimately
see its value as well and enact it or something like it. The proposed
rule's central feature is to require the explicit statement of
constitutionality at the actual time of acting upon or voting upon not
only bills but also amendments and conference reports. Requiring such
statements at the stage of bill introduction seems unduly burdensome,
since very few bills that are introduced are ever voted on. On the other
133. For instance, Senate Rule XIX prohibits senators from, inter alia, "refer[ring] offensively
to any State of the Union." Rules of the Senate, http://perma.ce/A8WR-JAS7 (senate.gov, archived
Feb. 6, 2014). Despite the absence of any direct sanction for failing to observe this rule, in my
experience members of the Senate respect the rule simply as a reflection of their obligations as
members of the Senate.
872 [Vol. 67:3:837
OBLIGATION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
hand, requiring such explanations substantially prior to a scheduled or
anticipated vote in committee or on the floor does make sense.
The proposed Senate rule also makes it clear, as the House Rule
does not, that each member is individually responsible for considering
as he or she votes the constitutionality of a bill or amendment.
Therefore, this consideration is the individual responsibility of a
conscientious senator and not just the duty of the institution as a whole.
This new Senate rule would apply to all types of constitutional issues,
including limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights and other provisions
of the Constitution, not just Article I. The proposed rule would stand in
contrast to the narrow and politically tilted nature of the House Rule,
which does not contain a comprehensive requirement or guidelines
indicating the entirety of the obligation the Founders assumed
Congress had. For the first time, a house of Congress will have
employed its power to "determine its own rules" in order to make it clear
that members are to consider all aspects of the constitutionality of what
they create before sending it on to the President and perhaps the courts.
In other words, there would be no ambiguity as to this obligation-it
was intended to be and is part of the job.
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